Abstract. Uncertainty and indistinguishability are two independent aspects of privacy. Uncertainty refers to the property that the attacker cannot tell which private value, among a group of values, an individual actually has, and indistinguishability refers to the property that the attacker cannot see the difference among a group of individuals. While uncertainty has been well studied and applied to many scenarios, to date, the only effort in providing indistinguishability has been the well-known notion of k-anonymity. However, k-anonymity only applies to anonymized tables. This paper defines indistinguishability for general situations based on the symmetry among the possible private values associated with individuals. The paper then discusses computational complexities of and provides practical algorithms for checking whether a set of database views provides enough indistinguishability.
Introduction
In many data applications, it's necessary to measure privacy disclosure in released data to protect individual privacy while satisfying application requirements. The measurement metrics used in prior work have mainly been based on uncertainty of private property values, i.e., the uncertainty what private value an individual has. These metrics can be classified into two categories: non-probabilistic and probabilistic. The non-probabilistic metrics are based on whether the private value of an individual can be uniquely inferred from the released data [1, 20, 7, 17, 5, 16] or whether the cardinality of the set of possible private values inferred for an individual is large enough [26, 27] . The probabilistic metrics are based on some characteristics of the probability distribution of
The work was partially supported by the NSF grants IIS-0430402, IIS-0430165, and IIS-0242237. Part of work of this author was done while visiting the University of Vermont.
the possible private values inferred from the released data [3, 2, 10, 9, 15, 4] (see Section 4 for more details).
However, uncertainty is only one aspect of privacy and it alone does not provide adequate protection. For example, we may reveal employee John's salary to be in a large interval (say, 100K to 300K annually). There may be enough uncertainty. However, if we also reveal that the salaries of all other employees are in ranges that are totally different from John's range (say, all are subranges of 50K to 100K), then John's privacy may still be violated. As another example, suppose from the released data we can infer that all patients in a hospital may only have Cold or SARS except that John may have Cold or AIDS. Even though the uncertainty of John's sickness has the same "magnitude" as that of the other patients, John may still feel his privacy is violated, since he is the only one who possibly has AIDS.
To adequately protect privacy, we need to consider the other aspect, namely, indistinguishability. Indeed, the privacy breach in the above examples can be viewed as due to the fact that from the released data, an individual is different from all other individuals in terms of their possible private values. In other words, the examples violate a privacy requirement, namely, the "protection from being brought to the attention of others" [11] . What we need is to have each individual belong to a group of individuals who are indistinguishable from each other in terms of their possible private values derived from the released data. In this way, an individual is hidden in a crowd that consists of individuals who have similar/same possible private values. For instance, in the above salary example, to protect John's privacy, we may want to make sure that attackers can only derive from the released data that a large group of employees have the same range as John's for their possible salaries.
Uncertainty and indistinguishability are two independent aspects for providing privacy; one does not imply the other. From the above examples, we can see that uncertainty cannot ensure good indistinguishability. Likewise, good indistinguishability cannot ensure enough uncertainty. For instance, if in the released data many employees have the same single possible salary value, then these employees are indistinguishable from each other in terms of their salaries, but there is not enough uncertainty to protect their privacy (all their salaries are the same and revealed!).
Our idea of indistinguishability is inspired by the notion of k-anonymization [24, 25, 21, 14, 18] as it can be viewed as a generalization of anonymization. The idea of k-anonymization is to recode, mostly by generalization, publicly available quasi-IDs in a single released table, so that at least k individuals will have the same recoded quasi-IDs. (Quasi-IDs are values on a combination of attributes that can be used to identify individuals through external sources [24, 25] .) In our view, this is an effort to provide indistinguishability among k individuals, since the recoding makes the individuals indistinguishable from each other. (As noted above, indistinguishability does not guarantee uncertainty. This is also true for k-anonymization, which is illustrated by the improvement reported in [19] . The authors impose an additional requirement on anonymization, namely, by requiring diverse private values among the tuples with the same recoded quasi-ID, in order to achieve, in our view, both indistinguishability and uncertainty.) While k-anonymity is an interesting notion, it only applies to anonymized tables. In this paper, we define two kinds of indistinguishability, and the corresponding privacy metrics, that can be applied to general situations, including anonymized tables and relational views. We show that k-anonymization is a special case of one kind of indistinguishability under a certain assumption (see Section 2.3).
Both notions of indistinguishability introduced in this paper are based on certain symmetry between individuals and their private values in the released data. More specifically, the first definition requires symmetry for all possible private values while the second definition bases on symmetry referring only to certain subsets of possible private values. With the two kinds of indistinguishability defined, we turn to study the problem of deciding whether a set of database views provides enough indistinguishability. We study the computational complexity as well as practical algorithms. We focus on checking for indistinguishability since checking for uncertainty has been extensively studied [1, 7, 17, 5, 26, 16, 27] .
We summarize the contributions of this paper as follows. (1) We identify indistinguishability as a requirement for privacy in addition to uncertainty, provide formal definitions of different kinds of indistinguishability, and study their properties. (2) We analyze the computational complexity and introduce practical checking methods for deciding whether a set of database views provides enough indistinguishability.
The rest of paper is organized as follows. We give formal definitions of indistinguishability and privacy metrics in Section 2. We then focus on checking database views against these privacy metrics in Section 3. In Section 4 we review the related work. Finally, we conclude with a summary in Section 5.
Indistinguishability

Preliminaries
In this paper, we consider releasing data from a single private table T bl with schema D. The attributes in D are partitioned into two sets, B and P . The set B consists of the public attributes; P consists of the private attributes. For simplicity and without loss of generality, we assume P only has one attribute.
We assume that the projection on B, Π B (T bl), is publicly known. In the salary example, this means that the list of employees is publicly known. We believe this assumption is realistic in many situations. In other situations where this is not true, we may view our approach as providing a conservative privacy measure.
Given a relation r B on B, we will use I B to denote the set {I|Π B (I) = r B }, i.e., the set of the relations on D whose B-projection coincides with r B . The domain of P is denoted by Dom(P ). A tuple of an instance in I B is denoted by t or (b, p), where b is in Π B (T bl) and p is in Dom(P ). The set I B corresponds to all possible private table instances by only knowing Π B (T bl).
Furthermore, we assume B is a key in D, which means that each composite value on B appears at most once in the private table. We also assume B is a quasi-ID, and hence, the tuples in T bl describe associations of the private attribute values with individuals. (Recall that a quasi-ID is a combination of attribute values that can be used to identify an individual.) Such associations are the private information to be protected.
In Figure 1 [B] interchangeably. The private attribute is P roblem. Here, P roblem is drawn from a finite discrete domain. (In general the private attribute also can be drawn from an infinite or a continuous domain; but it should not be difficult to extend our study to infinite discrete or continuous domains).
We assume that the data in T bl are being released with a publicly-known function M . We also use v to denote the result of M () on the private 
Symmetric Indistinguishability
As Note that such a swap is required for all the instances yielding v, hence this definition is in terms of v, not the current table T bl (although we used the projection Π B (T bl) in the definition, this projection is not T bl itself and is assumed publicly known). In other words, to be SIND is to be able to swap their private values in all the possible instances, including T bl.
For example, consider the released view v in Figure 2 on the table in Figure 1. The two B tuples t 9 [B] and t 10 [B] are SIND, because they can swap their P roblem values in any instance that yields v while still yielding the same v. Similarly, the two B tuples t 11 [B] and t 12 [B] are also SIND. However, t 9 [B] and t 11 [B] are not SIND, even though they have the same P roblem value Hypertension in the current private table. To show this, consider an instance obtained by swapping the P roblem values of t 9 and t 10 in T bl (while other tuples remain unchanged). So now t 9 has ChestP ain while t 10 has Hypertension. Denote the new instance T bl . Clearly, T bl also yields the view v. However, in T bl , if we swap the P roblem values of t 9 (i.e., ChestP ain) with that of t 11 (i.e., Hypertension), then both t 9 and t 10 will have Hypertension. Therefore, the new instance obtained from T bl does not yield v, and hence t 9 and t 11 are not SIND.
The We can also use a probability model to illustrate the indistinguishability by SIND. If we assume each B tuple has the same and independent a priori distribution over its private values, then we can easily prove that the two B tuples have the same a posteriori distribution over their private values after data released, due to complete symmetry in terms of their private values.
The binary relation SIND is reflexive, symmetric and transitive. That is, SIND is an equivalence relation. It is easy to see that it is reflexive and symmetric. We prove the transitivity as follows. Thus, all the B tuples that are indistinguishable from each other form a partition of the B tuples. Each set in the partition, which we call a SIND set, is the "crowd" that provides individual privacy. The sizes of these crowds reflect how much protection they give to the individuals in the crowd. So we have the following metric.
Definition 2. (k-SIND) Given a released data v, if each SIND set has a cardinality of at least k, we then say v provides k-SIND.
Relationship with k-Anonymity
In this subsection, we discuss the relationship between k-SIND and k-anonymity. In the k-anonymity literature (e.g., [24, 25, 21, 14, 18] ), the released data is an anonymized table. Anonymization is a function from quasi-IDs to recoded quasiIDs, and the anonymization process (the function M in Section 2.1) is to replace quasi-IDs with recoded quasi-IDs. We assume that the anonymization algorithm and the input quasi-IDs are known. In fact, we make a stronger assumption, called "mapping assumption", which says that (1) each quasi-ID maps to one recoded quasi-ID and (2) given a recoded quasi-ID, attackers know which set of quasi-IDs map to it.
As an example, there is a Under the above assumption, we have the following conclusion about the relationship between k-SIND and k-anonymity. Here the attributes of quasi-IDs are assumed to be exactly the public attributes B. By definition, k-anonymity is applicable only to a single anonymized table, but not to other kinds of released data such as multiple database views.
Restricted Symmetric Indistinguishability
Since SIND requires symmetry in terms of all possible private values, it is a rather strict metric. We define another metric based on the symmetry in terms of not all possible private values but only a subset that includes the actual private values in the current private table. If B tuples are symmetric in terms of this subset of private values, even though they are not symmetric in terms of other values, we may still take them as indistinguishable. The intuition here is that we intend to provide more protection on the actual private values.
We associate each B tuple with a set of private values including its current private value. These sets form a collection. More specifically, we call a collection P of Dom(P ) value sets P 1 , ..., P n a private value collection, where
If two B tuples are symmetric w.r.t. a private value collection, then we take them as indistinguishable. More formally, we have the following definition. We abbreviate restricted symmetric indistinguishability as RSIND. 
Definition 3. (RSIND) Given a released data v on the current
In this definition, unlike SIND, which swaps all possible private values, RSIND only swaps private values in a subset including the current private values. RSIND becomes SIND if P i = Dom(P ) for each i.
For example, consider the two views in Figure 3 (see caption) on the table in Figure 1 . From the view, we can deduce that in the private Given a private value collection P 1 , ..., P n , RSIND is also a binary equivalence relation, hence induces a partition over the B tuples; and each set in the partition is called an RSIND set w.r.t. P 1 , ..., P n . Obviously, if v provides k-SIND, we can let P 1 , ..., P n be the collection of all possible private values, i.e., P s = {p|∃I ∈ I v (b s , p) ∈ I}, where s = 1, ..., n. Then each pair of SIND values are RSIND w.r.t. P 1 , ..., P n , hence the SIND partition is the RSIND partition w.r.t. P 1 , ..., P n . Clearly, the cardinality of each set in this RSIND partition is at least k since each set in the SIND partition is so. Thus, we have the following proposition. In Figure 3 , the second view makes t 1 not have Obesity which others may have. The views do not provide 2-SIND, but do provide 2-RSIND. For example, consider the SIND partition of Figure 3 (b) as an RSIND partition (note again that there are many RSIND partitions with difference private value collections and the SIND partition is one of them). We have that t 2 v that contains that permutation. The size of each set in a private value collection matters in measuring privacy disclosure, which is not reflected in k-RSIND. Generally, the more P values in the collection, the better indistinguishability we achieve since we ignore the fewer P values that may make B tuples distinguishable. Also, more private values may mean better uncertainty. However, in this paper, we are not pursuing this direction.
Checking Database Views
In this section, we focus on checking released data that are in the form of a view set for indistinguishability. A view set is a pair (V, v), where V is a list of selection-projection queries (q 1 , q 2 , ..., q n ) on T bl, and v is a list of relations (r 1 , r 2 , ..., r n ) that are the results, with duplicates preserved, of the corresponding queries. We may abbreviate (V, v) to v if V is understood. In this paper, "view", "query" and "query result" are used interchangeably when no confusion arises. Note all query results preserve duplicates, hence, are multisets and all relational operations in this paper are on multisets.
Checking for k-SIND
In this subsection, we will show that checking for k-SIND is intractable. Then, we will present a subcase where checking is tractable, before which the basic checking mechanism is presented. Finally, we will also present a conservative checking methods that always catch k-SIND violation, but may make mistakes when a view set actually provides k-SIND.
Complexity Checking for k-SIND is intractable. This is mainly because it is intractable to know whether a private value can associate with a particular B tuple by just looking at the view set.
Theorem 1. Given a view set v containing only selection and projection, it is NP-hard to decide whether there exists an instance I ∈ I v such that a tuple (b, p) is in I.
The proof of the above theorem is by showing a reduction to our problem from the following NP-hard Complement Boolean Auditing Problem (whose complement, Boolean auditing problem, has been shown as coNP-hard [17] ).
Theorem 2. Given a view set v, whether v provides k-SIND is coNP-hard.
We reduce the complement of the problem in Theorem 1 (that is, determining if a tuple (b, p) appears in at least one instance in I v ) to the problem of checking k-SIND. Given any table T bl and view set v, we construct another table T bl and view set v , such that v violates 2-SIND iff (b, p) appears in at least one instance in I v . Because it is NP-hard to determine the latter by Theorem 1, it is coNP-hard to determine if v satisfies 2-SIND.
Basic mechanism for checking First, we introduce an important property of SIND in Proposition 4. This property will be used in the subsequent checking methods. 
The other direction holds for the same reason.
We call the equation in this proposition swap equation. This proposition suggests SIND for selection-projection views has the property of being "local". Indeed, to check SIND between given two B tuples, we do not need to see other B tuples.
More specifically, this proposition says that given v and two SIND 
To satisfy swap equation
there are only two possibilities: one is
and the other is
If a view has a projection on P and p 1 is distinct from p 2 , we can easily prove that we only need to check the latter condition. For example, consider the view q in Figure 2 with the projection on P . Clearly, q((t 9 [B] , H)) = q ((t 10 [B] , H)) and q((t 9 [B], C)) = q ((t 10 [B], C) ), where H = Hypertension and C = ChestP ain. Since H and C are the only possible values by looking at the view, we know t 9 [B] and t 10 [B] are SIND.
In the rest of this subsection, we use Proposition 4 to decide whether a view set v provides k-SIND.
Selection only on B attributes This subcase is common, especially in statistical databases, and hence is extensively studied with uncertainty measures [1, 17, 16] . In this subcase, each query in the view set has a selection condition only on the attributes in B. If so, checking for k-SIND can be done in polynomial time in the size of the private table and the number of views.
We assume the projection of each view contains P ; otherwise, no private information is involved since the selection condition also does not have P and the view may be removed from our consideration. By Proposition 4, we have following conclusion for checking. We assume that the set of k indistinguishable B tuples must have at least two distinct possible private values; otherwise, it must not be safe. Thus, the condition of Proposition 5 is a necessary and sufficient condition. By this proposition, we can present an efficient checking method through partitioning. The basic idea is that for each view, we can partition tuples such that each set in the partition are SIND w.r.t. this view, and we then intersect these partitions.
Proposition 5. Given a view set v with selection conditions only on the attributes in B, two B tuples b 1 and b 2 are SIND if for each query
As an example of this procedure, consider the two views Π Race,P roblem σ Zip= 22030 (T bl) and Π Gender,P roblem σ Race= W hite (T bl). We partition the B tuples as Figure 4 (a) by the first view and by the second view as Figure 4 (b) ; the final result in Figure 4 (c) is the intersection of the two partitions shown in (a) and (b). For each view, the selected tuples that have the same values on the projection are grouped in the same set of the partition, (Zip, Race) for the first and (Race, Gender) for the second; the tuples that are not selected are grouped into another set in the partition. If two B tuples are in (a) By the second view
(c) The final partition Now we analyze the computational complexity of this checking procedure. The partitioning for each view q in this procedure needs to search for the set of B tuples yielding the same result of q. Such searching can be done using a hash data structure, hence is constant time. And each partition needs to scan all the B tuples in T bl once. Thus the computing time is O(nS), where S is the size of T bl and n is the number of views in the view set.
Conservative checking Because checking a view set for k-SIND is generally intractable, we may want to perform a conservative-style checking that is polynomial time and suitable for all cases. With a conservative algorithm, we always catch k-SIND violation, but we may make mistakes when a view set actually provides k-SIND.
First, we can use a conservative checking method for each single view q. The basic idea is that if two B tuples have the same characteristics in the selection condition and have the same value on the B attributes in the projection of q, then they are SIND for q.
More specifically, if two B tuples b 1 and b 2 have the same values on the B attributes in the projection of q, and after substitute B with b 1 and b 2 , respectively, in the selection condition, the two substituted conditions have the same set of P values making the conditions true, then they are SIND. We can see that this method does not look for the possible private values. Thus, it has the similar procedure as the checking method for the case where v selects only B attributes in Subsection 3.1. That is, generate a partition for each view by the corresponding attribute values of B tuples and intersect these partitions.
For example, consider the view Π Zip σ Charge>Salary (T bl) on the table T bl. Each distinct Charge value c has the different set of Salary values making the selection condition true when you substitute Charge with c in the condition. Thus, if two B tuples have the same (Zip, Charge) value, then we take them as SIND; otherwise, we do not.
Clearly, this method for checking each single view is polynomial time. Then we can use the following conclusion to check a set of views. We have that if two b tuples are SIND w.r.t. each view in v, then then b 1 and b 2 are SIND w.r.t. v. Therefore, we can generate a SIND partition for each view in v, and then intersection these partitions to get a SIND partition for v. All the B tuples in the same set of the partition for v must be SIND. Then if the cardinality of each set of the final partition is at least k, the view set provides k-SIND. Otherwise, it may not do.
Checking in this way can be done in polynomial time, and is a conservative method to check the sufficient condition of SIND. We believe this conservative checking is practical, since we do not check what possible private values each individual has. In fact, it has the similar idea as k-anonymization methods [24, 25, 21, 14, 18] . Indeed, this checking does not look for the possible private values but looks at the public values while k-anonymization recodes only the public values of tuples to achieve k-anonymity.
Checking for k-RSIND
In this section, we turn to checking whether there exists an RSIND partition such that the cardinality of each set in the partition is at least k. By Proposition 3, we can check whether there exists this kind of partition by looking for the B tuples in each set that are RSIND from each other w.r.t. their current private values.
To do this, given a set T of tuples in T bl, we need to check whether for each pair of B tuples b 1 and b 2 in Π B (T ), each pair of P values p 1 and p 2 in Π P (T ), and each instance I in I v that contains (b 1 , p 1 ) and (b 2 , p 2 ), there exists an instance
Through the similar deduction as in Proposition 4, this swap is equivalent to that for each query q in v, we must have q ({(b 1 , p 1 
For and q((b 1 , p 1 )) = q((b 2 , p 1 )) and q((b 1 , p 2 )) = q((b 2 , p 2 ) ), or (2) q does not contain the projection on P , but q ((b 1 , p 1 )) = q((b 1 , p 2 ) ) and q ((b 2 , p 1 ) Therefore, we apply the following checking method. If we can find a maximal partition over the B tuples Π B (T bl) such that each pair of B tuples in each set in the partition are CSIND, then this partition is an RSIND partition. Here, "maximal" means that the union of any two sets in the partition cannot result in a set in which each pair of B tuples are still CSIND. In this way, we can find an RSIND partition by checking whether each pair of tuples in the current table is able to swap their private values. This provides a conservative checking algorithm for k-RSIND as follows.
Construct a graph G. Each tuple maps to a node. If two tuples are CSIND, which can be easily checked based on the current private table, add an edge between the corresponding nodes. Then a complete subgraph of G is a subset of an RSIND set. Therefore, finding an RSIND partition can be transformed to finding a maximal clique partition. If each query of v contains the projection on P , the above checking algorithm is a precise (not conservative) algorithm.
It is known, however, that finding a clique partition with each block's size of at least k is NP-hard [13] . It is not difficult to prove that it is NP-hard to decide whether v provides k-RSIND in the special case where each query of v contains the projection on P . Therefore, given a released view set v, it is NP-hard to decide whether v provides k-RSIND.
Nevertheless, we can use the heuristic algorithms in [13] to find a clique partition with each block size at least k. This will result in a conservative algorithm even for the special case where each query in v contains the projection on P .
For example, consider the views in Figure 3 . We construct a graph as Figure 5 . Each edge represents that the B tuples corresponding to the two adjacent nodes are CSIND. An RSIND partition maps to a maximal clique partition in the graph.
Related Work
The most relevant work to indistinguishability is k-anonymization, which focuses on how to gain k-anonymity by recoding the quasi-IDs in a single view, e.g., [24, 25, 21, 14, 18] . Recently, there is another work [19] aiming to achieve good uncertainty while gaining k-anonymity by imposing additional requirements on anonymization. But k-anonymity applies only to the case where released data is an anonymized table. In our work, we introduced different definitions of indistinguishability that apply to more general situations, and focused on checking data base views against these indistinguishability metrics. We also discussed the relationship between k-anonymity and indistinguishability.
Some work studies the privacy or secrecy disclosure by general database views. The conditions of perfect secrecy are studied in [22, 8] using probability model, and in [28] using query conditional containment. In this paper, we addressed the case where we intend to release data if some partial disclosure by database views is tolerated, and hence the disclosure needs to be measured.
Except for the study of k-anonymity, the privacy metrics used in prior work have mainly been based on uncertainty of private property values, i.e., the uncertainty what private value an individual has. These metrics can be classified into two categories: non-probabilistic and probabilistic.
The non-probabilistic metrics are mainly used in the fields of inference problem of statistical databases [1, 17, 16, 26] , multilevel databases [20, 5] and general purpose databases [7, 5, 27] . The most often used one is that if the private value of an individual cannot be uniquely inferred, released data about the individual are considered safe [1, 20, 7, 17, 5, 16] . The other one is the cardinality of the set of possible private values for each individual, among which attackers cannot determine which one is the actual one [26, 27] (The metric used in [27] is an uncertainty metric in spite of the notion of k-anonymity introduced).
In the above fields, some uncertainty metrics are based on probability. Authors use the probability value associated with the actual value [12, 16] or the variance of the probability distribution of private values [1, 23] . Most work in privacy-preserving data mining uses probability-based metrics. Their metrics are based on only the characteristics of the a posteriori probability distribution of private values [3, 2, 10] , or on both a priori and the a posteriori distribution [2, 9, 15, 4] . The work in [6] uses indistinguishability based on probability "distance" as privacy metric.
In this work, we used symmetry-based indistinguishability metrics. And we illustrated that uncertainty needs to be supplemented with indistinguishability.
Conclusions
In this paper, we identified a requirement of privacy in data release, namely indistinguishability, in addition to uncertainty. We first gave two definitions of indistinguishability, namely, SIND and RSIND. Then we focused on checking database views against these indistinguishability metrics. Generally, checking for k-SIND is intractable. We presented a case where polynomial algorithms are possible. Furthermore, we presented a conservative checking method. Checking for RSIND is easy, but checking for k-RSIND is intractable and can be done in a conservative way with heuristic polynomial algorithms.
